A new hypothesis paper published in The Neuroscientist challenges the dominant view that the brain’s outer layer is where the ‘me inside’ lives.

Axonal pathways that render nociceptive and visual inputs subjectively experienced according to the brainstem theory. Image credit: Devor et al., doi: 10.1177/1073858426147036.
“Raw sentience, the ‘me inside,’ remains 100% present even when the bulk of, or perhaps all, sensory input is blocked along with input from stored memory,” said lead author Dr. Marshall Devor from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and his colleagues.
“Try it! Close your eyes and cover your ears . . . ‘you’ are still there, 100%. ‘You’ are not fractional despite the fact that perhaps 70% of what you were ‘conscious of’ just a moment ago is now gone.”
“The brainstem theory of consciousness proposes that the sense of a ‘me inside,’ alternatively referred to as raw consciousness, phenomenal consciousness, first person, or core consciousness, ‘something it’s like to be . . .,’ or simply ‘sentience,’ is a result of computations carried out by neural circuitry located in the brainstem.”
The cortex, according to the researchers, supplies the content of experience but not the experiencer.
They build their argument around a familiar experience: pain. Electrical stimulation of the cortex reliably produces flashes of light in the visual cortex, sounds in the auditory cortex and tingling in the sensory cortex, but there is no recognized ‘primary pain cortex.’
Painful epileptic seizures are rare: one study evoked pain at only 8 of 313 sites tested in the insula, a region often proposed as a pain center. Stimulation along the brainstem’s ascending pain pathways, by contrast, evokes felt pain.
Large cortical lesions, including those from prefrontal lobotomies, did not eliminate pain or cause unconsciousness, and people who are cortically blind are no less sentient than sighted people.
The scientists also point to children born without a cerebral cortex who appear to show signs of joy and pain, while acknowledging that such observations are limited because these children cannot express their internal states in language.
Small lesions in the brainstem, however, often cause coma, and general anesthetics injected into the same area can knock out consciousness.
The region is the mesopontine tegmentum, which is about 3 by 4 mm across in rats. Within it lies a spot their team identified, the mesopontine tegmental anesthesia area.
In rats, microinjections of tiny amounts of an anesthetic there rapidly and reversibly induced anesthesia, while slightly off-target injections did not. This region matches the consensus location where strokes cause coma in human patients.
The authors describe the brainstem as an ‘adjudicator.’ In their account, the cortex does the heavy computing, such as telling a distant cloud from a charging rhinoceros, and passes along an assessment of its importance for survival.
The brainstem then decides whether the stream merits conscious attention, and if so ‘marks’ it, while other processing continues ‘robotically,’ like a self-driving car.
For pain, the evolutionary-fitness signal arrives directly from nerve fibers, with no cortical processing needed.
Evolution did not reinvent consciousness when the mammalian cortex emerged. It simply connected the new cortex to a brainstem system that had been working for hundreds of millions of years.
“Except for pain, advanced sensory feature extraction requires the supercomputer-like capacity of the mammalian cerebral cortex, available evolutionarily only eons after reptiles,” the researchers said.
“Rather than reinventing sentience circuitry with cortical architecture, evolution exploited the sentience-of-pain capability long functioning in the brainstem with the aid of dedicated axonal pathways.”
“This explains why large cortical lesions disrupt ‘consciousness of’ specific things, without causing unconsciousness, while focal brainstem lesions erase all sentience, including pain, sending the individual into oblivion.”
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Marshall Devor et al. Brainstem Theory of Consciousness. The Neuroscientist, published online August 25, 2026; doi: 10.1177/1073858426147036






